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Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little
temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. 1
[H]e thatfilchesfrom me my good name, robs me of that which not
enriches him, but makes me poor indeed.2
I. INTRODUCTION

On September 11, 2001, 19 terrorists managed to board domestic
commercial aircraft despite the current security measures; fly 2 planes into
the World Trade Center causing its eventual collapse, and kill
approximately 2800 people.' The hijackers crashed a third aircraft into the
symbolic heart of America's military, the Pentagon, killing another 184
people and injuring dozens more.4 Yet another plane was crashed into the
tranquil Pennsylvania countryside killing 40 more. An unknown fact to
many Americans was that the hijackers had been identified as flight risks
that very day by airport security but were allowed to board their planes.'
In response to this great tragedy, Congress descended upon a course of
action which will change the face of our country's liberty for years to
come.

1. Benjamin Franklin, PennsylvaniaAssembly: Reply to the Governor,Nov. 11, 1755, in
6 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 242 (Leonard W. Labaree ed., 1963). This same inscription
is located on the base pedestal of the Statute of Liberty.
2. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, scene 3 (7th ed. 1958). Shakespeare, however,
failed to recognize the future permutations of identity theft or did not have to deal with its farreaching repercussions. If he had known what lay ahead, the "great bard" would have spoken about
how identity theft can enrich criminals with little to no threat of apprehension and the lasting effects
it could have on the victim.
3. The exact number of lives lost at the world trade center is unknown. See Rebecca
Blackmon Joyner, Note, An Old Lawfor a New World? Third-PartyLiabilityfor TerroristsActsFrom the Klan to Al Qaeda,72 FORDAm L. REV. 427, 461-62 n.281 (2003); Leigh A. Kite, Note,
Red FlaggingCivil Liberties and Due ProcessRights ofAirline Passengers:Will A Redesigned
CAPPSIISystem Meet the ConstitutionalChallenge?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1385, 1387(2004).
4. See generally Phil Hirschkorn, New York Adjusts Terrorist Death Toll Downward,
CNN.coM, Aug. 22, 2002, availableat http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/08/22/911.toll (referencing
death toll at attack sites) (last visited Aug. 24, 2006). Analysts have suggested that the fourth plane
also targeted the Pentagon but passengers or crew may have managed to thwart the hijacker's
efforts, thereby preventing more deaths. Id.
5. The pilot program of Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS)
correctly identified the would-be hijackers as threat risks but no legislation was in place whereby
passengers could be refused boarding if identified by the CAPPS system. Kite, supra note 3, at
1387-88.
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America's fear of terrorism had arrived and embedded itself in the
mind of every citizen.6 It has been said that terrorism's goal is to kill "the
few," to frighten "the many."7 The events of September eleventh
unmistakably accomplished this goal as the nation became gripped with
fear and uncertainty. With so much doubt pervading our modem psyche,
citizens cling to their routine to establish order out of chaos. However,
once that routine becomes the source of uncertainty as it did after 9/11,
inevitably people fight to re-establish order and control. The "fly in the
ointment," compounding America's attempt to regain control, is that not
all parties are playing by the same set of rules. Now in addition to the ever
present threat of terrorism, Americans must face a new threat, having their
identity stolen by opportunistic charlatans.'
Attempts to find order amongst chaos have led America to some of its
darkest hours. Rampant fear has unfortunately flourished into the erosion
of civil liberties.9 American history is fraught with examples of Congress
or the courts drastically limiting freedom of expression or civil liberties.'°
Apparently, history has not been America's teacher. America is once again
6. See 147 CONG. REC. S9583 (daily ed. Sept. 21,2001) (senate announcing realization of
terrorist threat and illustrating concern that security of airports is a matter of national security).
7. See generally CHUCK LAWLISS, THE MARINE BOOK: A PORTRAIT OF AMERICA'S
MILITARY ELITE (1992). In contrast, the goal of war is to kill large numbers to force a change in
position of the few. Id.
8. Criminals are by no means "stupid" in the general sense of the word. Criminals have
realized it is safer and more productive to steal someone's identity than to resort to traditional
crimes like armed robbery. Chris Osher, Region Ripe ForIdentity Thieves, PITTSBURGHTRIB. REV.,
July 31, 2005. According to Osher, one deputy sheriff overhead an inmate tell another inmate:
I walk into a liquor store and stick a gun in a kid's ribs, and I'll get seven to
[fifteen] years... for $120 bucks and a carton ofcigs.. .[but if I find] a way to get
a person's name and their Social Security number, the most I'll get is a year. But
with that same name and Social Security I can take out $10,000 to $100,000
without even batting an eye.
Id. This new threat, combined with the fear of terrorism, creates an American landscape ripe for
fear and uncertainty. How-to-Books are now available to the savvy criminal wishing to learn the
trade of identity theft. See Alan Sipress, An Indonesian'sPrison Memoir Takes Holy War into
Cyberspace,WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2004, at Al 9. Therein, Sipress discusses a chapter written by
a cyber-terrorist, Imam Samudra entitled, "Hacking, Why Not?" Id. (Samudra describes how to
launder money, get away with online credit card scams, manipulate computer language and other
useful cyber-techniques).
9. See generally DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FREEDOMS INTHE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003); Alan Brinkley, A FamiliarStory: Lessonsfrom Past
Assaults on Freedoms, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS 23 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr.
eds., 2003); Diane P. Wood, The Rule of Law in Times of Stress, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 455, 455
(2003); Kite, supra note 3, at 1387.
10. See, e.g., COLE, supra note 9; Wood, supra note 9, at 455; Kite, supra note 3, at 1389.
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at a crossroad and leaning toward the well worn path of civil liberty
erosion.
After September 11th, legislation was passed which began eroding our
civil liberties.l' The USA PATRIOT Act authorized intrusive surveillance
and data reconnaissance targeting citizens and visitors alike. 2
Remembering past wrongs of this country and cautioning the Senate
against further erosions of civil liberty, Senator Russ Feingold said, "We
will lose [the war on terrorism] without a shot being fired if we [begin]
sacrifice[ing] the liberties of the American people in the belief that by
doing so we will stop the terrorists."' 3 Senator Feingold's plea apparently
fell on deaf ears as America charged once again into rash action.
America's systemic response was to focus on its physical infrastructure
rather than emerging cyber security issues. 4
Congress proceeded down a path where national security was once
again placed before fundamental rights. 5 Congress's passage of the
ATSA 16 and the ATSSSA 7 federalized many services and personnel
previously exclusively private. 8 While neither the ATSA nor ATSSSA

11. What is now known as the Patriot Act became law on October 26, 2001. Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 107 H.R. 3162 (2001) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT
Act].
12. Id. § 201.
13. 147 CONG. REc. Sl0, 570 (daily ed. Oct. 11,2001) (statement by Senator Feingold while
discussing the USA PATRIOT Act).
14. John D. Podesta & Raj Goyle, Perspective: Lost in Cyberspace? Finding American
Liberties in a DangerousDigital World, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 509 (2005) (quoting Paul B.
Kurtz, a former senior official in the Bush Administration and Executive Director of the Cyber
Security Industry Alliance).
15. Kevin Bankston & Megan E. Gray, Government Surveillance andData Privacy Issues:
FoundationsandDevelopments,PRIVACY & INFO L. REP., Apr. 2003, at 1, 3 (arguing that with little
to no regard for the disastrous impact on civil liberties the legislature passed the USA PATRIOT
Act with almost no debate). The USA PATRIOT Act greatly expands the government's ability to
spy upon its own citizens unchecked while weakening oversight which could prevent future abuses.
Id.; see Kite, supra note 3, at 1386 n.2 1. The USA PATRIOT Act enables far-reaching invasion of
privacy and monitoring of citizens and suspected terrorists including, but not limited to, planting
surveillance devices on electronics and amassing large computer databases containing sensitive
private information. See generally NAT HENTOFF, THE WAR ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE
GATHERING RESISTANCE (2003).
16. Aviation and Transportation SecurityAct, Pub. L. No. 107-71 (2001) [hereinafter ATSA].
17. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42 (2001)
[hereinafter ATSSSA].
18. See generally David T. Norton, Recent Developments in Aviation Law, 67 J. AIR L. &
COM. 1107, 1111-12 (2002).
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overtly erode civil liberties CAPPS, 9 CAPPS 120 and Secure Flight do.
Because of staunch opposition CAPPS II was not implemented by the
Transportation Security Act (TSA). A revised version known as "Secure
Flight" is now ready to be launched in 2006.2' However, before Secure
Flight's activation, TSA must consider and implement procedures
addressing the ever growing problem of identity theft.22
Part II of this Article will provide a brief history of Secure Flight and
its application in passenger surveillance. Part HI will then discuss data
mining and information utilization. Part IV discusses identity theft and its
widespread effects in America. Part V discusses the effects of false
positives likely to result from identity theft and the lack of redress
procedures used by TSA for those flagged during the check in process.
II. A SHORT

ACCOUNT OF COMPUTER AUTOMATED
PASSENGER SURVEILLANCE

After the crash of TWA Flight 800 in 1996, the U.S. government
formed the Gore Commission which recommended several suggestions to
the aviation industry which sought to enhance their security systems and
make air travel safer. 3 The Gore Commission used this platform to
conceptualize the Computer Automatic Passenger Surveillance (CAPS)
24
and the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS).
CAPPS was originally developed by Northwest Airlines in conjunction
with the FAA to integrate the abilities of a computer with available
19. CAPPS was developed by Northwest Airlines with a grant from the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) as a passenger profiling security mechanism for aviation. Charu A.
Chandrasekhar, Comment, Flying While Brown: FederalCivilRightsRemedies to Post9/11 Airline
RacialProfiling of South Asians, 10 AsIAN L.J. 215, 221 (2003).
20. Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II (CAPPS II) was an improved
system developed by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) based on the original
platforms ofCAPS (Computer Assisted Passenger Screening) and CAPPS. See id. at 222-23. CAPS
and CAPPS were replaced by the more advanced CAPPS II. Kite, supra note 3. CAPPS II was
subsequently replaced by Secure Flight. Id. at 1401.
21. James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, The Future of Internet Surveillance Law: A
Symposium to DiscussInternet Surveillance,Privacy&the USA PatriotAct:Surveillance,Records
& Computers: CommercialDataandNationalSecurity, 72 GEO. WASH.L. REv. 1459, 1468 (2004).
22. House Select Comm. On Homeland Sec.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Sec.,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cyber Sec.; Hearing on Passenger Pre-Screening, 110th CONG.
(2005) (Statement of James Dempsey, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Democracy and Tech.) (noting that
identity theft poses a serious problem to passenger screening and to Secure Flight).
23. Chandrasekhar, supra note 19, at 221.
24. White House Comm. on Aviation Safety and Sec., Final Report to Pres. Clinton (1997),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/212fin-l .html (last visited Nov. 3, 2005) [hereinafter
Gore Commission].
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information systems to focus on the growing concerns over aviation
safety.25 The FAA then adapted CAPS into the CAPPS which they offered
on a volunteer basis to all major airlines for implementation. 26 CAPPS uses
approximately forty pieces of personalized passenger data, retained in
secrecy, to detect passengers who fit a "profile" based on previously
determined criteria. 27 These data probably included a litany of basic travel
information. 28 The Gore Commission maintained that no religious or racial
data would be contained in the database but according to Chardrasekhar,
Asian advocacy groups have noted that the CAPPS profiling system
unfairly targeted them as "increased risk" because of their national or
racial identity. 29 Unfortunately, the CAPPS system and its data
components were never released before the system was taken offline.3 °
Shortly after September 11th, the ATSA mandated the creation, under
section 136, of an improved version of CAPPS to be implemented at all
airports in the United States and foreign hubs which service inbound
flights to America. 3 ' CAPPS 11 had been tested in several airports but
heavy resistance precluded its originally scheduled implementation at the
end of 2004.32 CAPPS II, as originally conceived, evaluated all incoming
passengers utilizing a process whereby the person's identification was
matched with a government linked commercial database to provide a
computer generated risk assessment.3 3 Civil liberty advocates challenged
CAPPS IIclaiming it treated all incoming passengers as potential terrorists

25. Id.
26. Chandrasekhar, supranote 19, at 221.
27. Id.
28. Information likely included the passenger's address, method of ticket purchase, travel
companions, rental status, ticket purchase date, departure date, destination, origin, and whether the
ticket was one way or round trip. Chandrasekhar, supra note 19, at 221 (citing Air Passenger
Profiling: Hearings Before the Aviation Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Transp. and
Infrastructure, 107th CONG. (2002)). This writer has been unable to locate any source which can
verify what information was actually included in either CAPS or CAPPS.
29. See id. at 226; see generally Jamie L. Rhee, Comment, Rational and Constitutional
Approaches To Airline Safety in the Face of Terrorist Threats, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 847 (2000).
30. Rhee, supra note 29, at 865. The components were never made public so academics may
only speculate as to what the components were prior to the systems removal. Id.
31. Kite, supra note 3, at 1387.
32. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Undersecretary Hutchinson's Remarks
at a CAPPS II Media Roundtable, available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?
content=-3166 (Feb. 13, 2004) (last visited Aug. 24, 2006). Civil liberty organizations strongly
opposed CAPPS II because of fears that people would be accidentally detained without actually
catching all terrorists. See Kite, supra note 3, at 1391-92.
33. Kite, supra note 3, at 1391; see generally Notice of Status of Sys. of Rec.; Interim Final
Notice; Request for Further Comments, 68 Fed. Reg. 45265 (Aug. 1, 2003).
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while privacy groups vehemently opposed the use of private information
being used against would be passengers.34
With CAPPS II, passengers would have been coded one of three ways
upon arriving at the terminal. (1) Red, the passenger is "untrustworthy"
and therefore a risk to the aircraft, wherein law enforcement would be
notified and the person would be arrested. (2) Yellow, the passenger is
"potentially untrustworthy" or may be a risk, but further investigation is
required wherein, depending on the outcome of the investigation, they
would be allowed to board the aircraft or precluded from flying. (3) Green,
"not untrustworthy" or the passenger had been identified as possessing
limited risk behavior making them eligible to board the aircraft. 35
Because of the opposition leveled at CAPPS II, the TSA and the White
House revoked the implementation of the program and demanded that it
be redesigned to respond to the policy concerns voiced by the opposition.
The new system, "Secure Flight" incorporates modifications that
presumably changed the risk assessment process and addressed the
pervasive privacy concerns which were inherent in the CAPPS II system.
Realistically however, Secure Flight has simply eliminated the middle
classification of "yellow" and removed certain computer risk assessment
algorithms, mined from vast commercial databases, in its verification
process.36 Secure Flight still uses data mining, and computer algorithms
34. See Kite, supranote 3, at 1391-92; see Leslie Miller, New PassengerScreeningPlan Not
Ready to Fly, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 14,2004, at 46; Matthew L. Wald, Government Is 'Reshaping'
Airport Screening System, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2004, at 46.
35. K.A. Taipale, Technology, Security& Privacy: The FearofFrankenstein,The Mythology
of Privacy and the Lessons of King Ludd, 7 YALE SYMP. L. & TECH. 123, *12 (2005) (Taipale
explained the program would label flyers as, "untrustworthy and denied access (and there may be
false positives), those deemed not-untrustworthy who are in-fact trustworthy and are allowed access
(good guys), and those deemed not-untrustworthy who are in-fact untrustworthy but have not been
yet identified as such and may be mistakenly allowed access (false negatives)").
36. Kite, supra note 3, at 1392.
37. Data mining is the process of compiling and aggregating individual data to be used for
computational purposes of personal evaluation. K.A. Taipale and Paul Rosenzweig have identified
three distinct applications:
[F]irst, subject-oriented link analysis, that is, automated analysis to learn more
about a particular data subject, [their] relationships, associations and actions;
[S]econd, "pattern-analysis" (or "data mining" in the narrow sense), that is,
automated analysis to develop a descriptive or predictive model based on
discovered patterns; and,
[T]hird, "pattern-matching," that is, automated analysis using a descriptive or
predictive model (whether [the model] itself developed through automated
analysis or not) against [additional datasets] to identify other related (or "like")
data subjects (people, places, things, relationships, etc.).
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taken from governmental databases of known terrorists compared against
huge commercial databases containing private information.38 To
understand the importance of Secure Flight's implementation, a brief
analysis of dataveillance and data mining must be undertaken.39
IlI. DATAVEILLANCE, DATA MINING A MODERN REBIRTH OF THE
PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR

A. Forms ofIdentification Captured
The different types of information retrieved by data mining, to be used
for dataveillance, while complex on its face, is nothing more than a
straightforward attempt to accurately identify someone. The identification
process can be broken down into three basic forms: Entity, Identity, and
Attribute. 40 Entity resolution is the "process whereby different identifiers
or different identities are resolved [] to the same entity or individual
usually through analysis of shared attributes." '1 Simply put, it is a
determination, at a certain confidence level, that the person presenting
their ID in front of the teller is whom the computer designates.42
Identity authentication is the level of confidence with which a
computer generated "identifier" is assigned to the correct person. For
example, the computer must determine whether "Bill Jones" is the same
K.A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots to Make Sense of Data,
5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 2, *13 (2003) (noting that these aggregated data and computer
analysis systems are tools to aid in human analytical thinking in order to manage and use the vast
amounts of information available); see also Paul Rosenzweig, Proposalsfor Implementing the
Terrorism Information Awareness System, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 169 (2004).
38. Dempsey & Flint, supra note 21, at 1468.
39. The term dataveillance, also known as pattern analysis or knowledge extraction, is the
process of analyzing aggregated data based on p-values dependent upon a desired level of error.
Dempsey & Flint, supranote 21, at 1463. That level of error, known as the P3
is based upon a level
of significance known as a. M. ANTHONY SCHORK & RICHARD D. REMINGTON, STATISTICS WITH
APPLICATIONS TO THE BIOLOGICAL AND HEALTH SCIENCES 166 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that type I
errors are commonly known as a errors and type II errors are known as 13errors). That information
is then converted into an output based upon a level of confidence to forecast a potential outcome.
Taipale, supra note 37, at * 10. The term "dataveillance," while cleverly combining "surveillance"
with "data" analysis is actually more technical than the word suggests. Id. Dataveillance uses more
than a simple review of data to survey an individual because the amount of data is too vast for an
efficient human analysis. Id.
40. Taipale, supra note 37, at *10-*1 1.
41. Id.at*l1.
42. Id.
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person as William Jones or Will Jones. 43 This identity match can be
achieved by incorporating technological evaluation methods like
passwords, fingerprint ID, DNA sniffers and retina and iris scanners.'
Once entity and identity are assured and the person is properly linked to
the information being represented on the computer, 45 attributeexamination
must be completed.46
Attribute authenticationis the "process of establishing confidence that
an attribute [] applies to a specific entity."' 7 Once a person is properly
identified, their information needs to be used for something practical like
assessing risk.48 Once these three levels of analysis are completed, the
ability to match the entity against an authorized watch list is only
as useful
49
it.
provided
which
database
or
list
watch
the
of
veracity
as the
All these data, warehoused by sources which store it, must not only be
useful but also obtained through legal channels. While much of the
information collected does not amount to a direct invasion of privacy, the
aggregation of information for the explicit purposes of examination and
extrapolation does create civil liberty concerns. Dataveillance poses
constitutional concerns because it raises privacy issues and utilizes lawful
activities to "presume" future guilt. Jeffrey Rosen capsulated this concern
to a special subcommittee50 and Congress recently heard testimony
requesting a nearly limitless search into people's lives for the sake of
security.5 Serious constitutional issues arise when (1) privacy rights are
43. Id. at *10-*11; Dempsey & Flint, supranote 21, at 1464-65.
44. Taipale, supranote 37, at 11.
45. Id.
46. It is appropriate to note that identity theft can cause serious problems at any stage of the
passenger prescreening process because the person seeking admittance could be either the thief or
the actual person. If it is the actual person presenting themselves for admission, they can be denied
access because of the thief s prior activities.
47. Taipale, supra note 37, at *11.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see generally BRUCE SCHNEIER, BEYOND FEAR 38-40 (2003).
50. Rosen stated that when the government takes part in, "mass dataveillance to conduct
general searches of millions of citizens without cause to believe that a crime has been committed,
the searches arguably raise the same dangers in the twenty-first century as the general warrants that
the [f]ramers of the Fourth Amendment feared in the eighteenth century." Data Mining: Current
Applications and Future Possibilities: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Tech., Info. Policy,
Intergovernmental Relations, and the Census, Comm. on Gov't Reform, 108th CONG. (2003)
[hereinafter Rosen] (statement of Jeffrey Rosen, Assoc. Professor, George Washington Univ. Law
Sch.), cited in Dempsey & Flint, supra note 21, at 1465 n.20.
51. Registered Traveler Program Implementation: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on
Econ. Sec., Infrastructure Protection, and Cyber Sec., 110th CONG. (2005) (emphasis added)
(statement of Jim Harper, Dir., Info. Pol'y Studies, Cato Institute). Jim Harper testified to a House
Select committee that, "The way to do real identity-based security is to do deep, deep background
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violated, (2) guilt is assigned before the crime, or (3) the government
creates a pretext screening to circumvent the Fourth Amendment. 2
B. BackgroundofDataveillance
Due process and Fourth Amendment issues are significant problems
when using personal data, without consent, to create risk assessments,
whereby an individual may be denied civil liberty protections. The federal
government, through the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate at the Department of Homeland Security Integration
Center, has given the FBI the authority to use data mining with private
data warehousing companies. 3 This act permits the U.S. government to
circumvent the Privacy and Information Act because the database is not
technically a "government database."54 Current laws allow these
commercial databases to be used for investigation of terrorist activities
without the hindrance of oversight by applicable privacy laws because they
are not government databases. Furthermore, privacy laws which would
ordinarily give citizens the right to review all their personal information
55
does not apply because the information is "privately maintained.
Government officials have supported their plans and assured privacy
groups that their use of the commercial data will be strictly monitored, yet
there are no programs in place which exist to oversee the government's
actual use of these databases. 6 Moreover, no legislation is in place to
control the privately held data, such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act
checks into people, know everything about them, where were they educated, what do they think
about stuff, how many kids do they have." Id.
52. For a more complete discussion of these topics, see Stephen W. Dummer, Comment,
Secure Flight and Dataveillance,A New Type Of Civil Liberties Erosion: Stripping Your Rights
Even When You Don't Know It, 75 Miss. L.J. 583 (2005).
53. See generally Glenn R. Simpson, Big Brother-in-Law:If the FBIHopes to Get the Goods
on You, It May Ask Choicepoint: US. Agencies' Growing Use of Outside Data Suppliers Raises
Privacy Concerns, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2001, at Al.
54. 5 U.S.C. § 522a(d) (Records Maintained on individuals). Because the government does
not "maintain" the database, citizens would be precluded from exercising the privilege created by
the Privacy Act. See, e.g., Dempsey & Flint, supranote 21, at 1472.
55. Dempsey & Flint, supra note 21, at 1472. The USA PATRIOT Act contains almost no
First Amendment safeguards and section 203 allows extensive sharing of information which is not
related to terrorist activities without regard to whether the information deals with legal or illegal
activities. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 11, § 203(a); Dempsey & Flint, supra note 21, at 1483.
The USA PATRIOT Act circumvents grand jury powers but with none of the criminal justice
system protections. USA PATRIOT Act, supranote 11, § 203(a). Moreover, no judicial approval
is required for the government's investigative activities nor does the act require disclosure of the
information used in identifying the individual. Id.
56. Dempsey & Flint, supra note 21, at 1471; see, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15
U.S.C.A. 1681-1691 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003) [hereinafter FCRA].
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(FCRA), which was passed to protect consumers from disclosure of
inaccurate information held by consumer credit reporting agencies. 57Thus,
private warehouses could dispense harmful errors with impunity to Secure
Flight. To make matters worse, the information held within these
commercial databases is absolutely secret.5 8 According to the TSA and the
Department of Homeland Security, if this information were released it
could permit would-be-terrorists to circumvent the system. 59
Understandably, there are important competing interests between national
security and notifying the public, however, at what cost should America's
safety come to its citizens?6"
C. ConstitutionalIssuesfor the FourthAmendment and Dataveillance
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches
and seizures. 6' According to Rosen, the U.S. Constitution's original
Framers were expressly concerned with investigations which delve into a
person's private life.62 While it is unlikely that the Framers could envision
mass private commercial databases being used by the government's
"thinking machines" or algorithmic risk assessment on people boarding
"flying machines," the Fourth Amendment likely applies. The Constitution
was drafted in such a manner as to provide for unseen contingencies and
technological advances. Now that emerging technologies are being used,
the American court system must apply all available resources to ensure the
Framers' intent is respected and that civil liberties are protected.
Dataveillance, at its heart, investigates a person who has yet to commit a
crime and then determines their proclivity for criminal behavior based on
unrelated past actions. While this seemingly Orwellian example may
57. Dempsey & Flint, supra note 21, at 1471. Unfortunately, the FCRA has done little to
spare victims from the wages of damage wrought by identity thieves. The FCRA only provides
avenues for victims to learn about the theft but does nothing itself to help fix a victim's destroyed
credit. The victim is left to spend hundreds of hours making calls and thousands of dollars to fix
their credit. Maria Bartiromo, Nik Deogun & Ed Mierzwinski DiscussIdentity Theft, WALL ST. J.
REP., July 17, 2005, at Al ("It can take victims anywhere from 60 to 600 hours to undo the damage.
And the cost, well anywhere from $1,200 to $16,000 if you factor in such expenses as legal fees,
higher interest rates and lost wages."); Tom Zeller, Jr., Identity Crises, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 1, 2005,
at B I (noting that victim devoted forty hours a week for several months to clear up his credit).
Moreover, the FCRA does nothing to help victims who have had their criminal histories corrupted
by criminals. Catherine Pastrikos, Comment, Identity Theft Statutes: Which Will ProtectAmericans
the Most? 67 ALB. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (2004).
58. Pastrikos, supra note 57, at 1137; Kite, supra note 3, at 1425.
59. Dempsey & Flint, supra note 21, at 1489.
60. See id. at 1489-90.
61. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
62. Dempsey & Flint, supra note 21, at 1467 n.20.
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appear to exaggerate the present dataveillance capabilities; the reality of
Secure Flight is not too far removed from George Orwell's post war novel,
Nineteen Eighty-Four,and its frightening concept of "thought crime"63
Compelling reasons exist to prevent persons from hijacking aircraft.
However, the error rate for Secure Flight could incorrectly flag nearly 800
to 1200 persons a day as "flight risks."' That means approximately one
thousand innocent persons per day could be denied their fundamental right
to travel because a data output suggested they may pose a flight risk.65
Unfortunately, a detailed discussion of these constitutional dilemmas is
beyond the scope of this Article.66 More important for our purposes is a
discussion of the exacerbating effects of identity theft on Secure Flight.
IV. IDENTITY THEFT: THE EVER EXPANDING THREAT DESTROYING
AMERICA'S CONFIDENCE

A. New Flies in the Old Ointment
Life in America is stressful enough considering the increasing
workload, diminishing amounts of free time along with the ever present
push for technological advancement and the necessity to "keep up to
speed" or risk losing your job, spouse, or home. Along with these
blossoming stress factors, criminals have graciously provided Americans
with yet another compounding factor to make our lives even more
complicated, stealing our identities for their own pecuniary gain.67
Innocent activities subject Americans to months or years of effort and
63. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1st Am. ed. 1949).
64. Id. at 1421; see also Sara Kehaulani Goo, Fliersto Be RatedforRisk Level: New System
Will Scrutinize Each Passenger,Assign Color Code, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2003, at AOl (stating
that security system will incorrectly identify two percent of passengers as flight risks). See infra
Parts V.A-B (discussing error rates).
65. While seeming far fetched now, this could be something as innocuous as buying oatmeal
on a Tuesday with your local retail bonus card and then accessing a flagged web site the next day.
Because no explanation has been given to the types of information or the algorithms used, it is
possible that completely lawful activities, when combined, could end up identifying a passenger
as a potential terrorist.
66. For a discussion of the Mathews Factors and Secure Flights Redress Procedures as they
apply to a constitutional review, see Dummer, supra note 52. See also KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN &
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONALLAW( 14th ed. 2001); William D. Anderson, Jr., Investigation
and Police Practice:Overview of the FourthAmendment, 82 GEO. L.J. 597 (1994).
67. See Michael Higgins, Identity Thieves, 84 A.B.A. J. 42, 45 (1998). Higgins notes:
"[I]dentity theft victims ... are left trying to explain [the problem] to creditors and collection
agencies, who often suspect the victim of being the imposter ... when [the creditors] never
bothered to ask [the thief] to prove who [they were]." Id.
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thousands of dollars to clean up their credit and good names.6" ID thieves
can expose citizens to the humiliation, anger and frustration of being
labeled a criminal.69 Moreover, with the implementation of Secure Flight,
identity theft victims will likely be denied the right to board aircraft if their
identities have been used in a manner which flags them as a "threat."7 °
Beyond antiquated methods of stealing one's identity, modem thieves
may harvest identities with new scams like: phishing, hooking, web
diverting, fraudulent Internet auctions, international modem dialing,
pretexting, skimming, and web cramming, to name only a few.7 '
Americans must now be ever vigilant to protect themselves from identity
theft. Sadly, many American's identities are stolen through no fault of
their own.72 Some thefts occur because businesses fail to take appropriate
care of customer files or information.73 Some thefts occur because
68.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TAKE CHARGE: FIGHTING BACK AGAINST IDENTITY THEFT

1-2 (2005) [hereinafter FTC, FIGHTING BACK]; see also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ID THEFT:
WHAT IT'S ALL ABOUT 1-3 (2005) [hereinafter FTC, ID THEFT]. The FTC noted that activities
entered into everyday like: writing checks, renting cars, mailing tax returns, changing service
providers or even applying for another credit card exposes citizens to identity theft. In fact,
something as simple as an e-mail or instant message on the Internet can expose victims to numerous
types of identity theft. See generally High-Technology Crime Prosecutor/Investigator Resource
CD-ROM: The Internet, Email and Internet Chat Investigations: A Guidefor Prosecutors and
Investigators,pts. II & III (Sept. 2004). This is especially relevant because studies project that by
2007 people will engage in approximately 1,380 billion instant messages per day and even more
e-mails. Id.
69. FTC, ID THEFT, supra note 68, at 1; Kristin Davis, But, Officer, That Isn't Me,
KIPLINGER'S PERSONALFIN., Oct. 2005, at Al. The Better Business Bureau suggests that about 4%
of the 9.3 million identity theft victims each year will have their names given to law enforcement
by the criminals to escape punishment, thereby wrongly labeling the victim a "criminal." Id.
70. Privacy Laws & Data Broker Servs.: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Sci., &
Transp. Comm., 110th CONG. (2005) (statement of Marc Rotenberg, President & Exec. Dir. Elec.
Privacy Info. Ctr.) (noting that identity theft exacerbates homeland security risk with the central
role that identity verification procedures like Secure Flight will play in passenger screening).
71. See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FTC CONSUMER ALERT, SPYWARE (July
2005); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TRAPPED IN THE TANGLED WEB: WEB SCHEME DIVERTS
CONSUMERS FROM THEIR INTENDED SITES (Oct. 2001); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, DOT CONSFACTS FOR CONSUMERS (Oct. 2000); see also Alan Stafford, Privacy in Peril,P.C. WORLD (Sept.

30,2005), availableathttp://msn.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid, 122498,00. asp (last visited Nov.
8, 2005) (describing how easily thieves can obtain your information and use it to make thousands
of dollars at a victim's expense); OnGuard Online.gov, Phishing (Sept. 2005) (on file with author).
72. Thieves can obtain the first seven digits of a victim's Social Security number from a
service called "People Finder" and then combine those digits with the remaining four digits
obtained from LexisNexis. Ken Buford, FDIC Investigative Examiner, Address at the University
of Mississippi Advanced Cyber Crime Training Conference: Advanced Training on Identity Theft
Symposium, Account Hijacking (Nov. 2,2005) [hereinafter Buford Address].
73. Id. FTC investigators discovered that Ashley Furniture was discarding reams ofold credit

applications in their dumpsters. Id. Thieves would then drive around to local Ashley Furniture
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businesses themselves are being "scammed" by highly organized conartists.74
Thieves typically target the elderly, children, and immigrants."
However, no one is free from risk.76 In fact, Jeff Kurtz with the Social
Security Administration, stated that "there is nothing we can do... it is
epidemic and it will hit most everyone sometime in the future. 7 7 Kurtz
admitted that the current situation stems from the commonplace use of the
Social Security Number (SSN) as a means ofpersonal identification. Kurtz
explained that the SSN was never intended to be used for anything other
than a governmental identification match for Social Security benefits.
Sadly, even Kurtz acknowledged that identity theft is at the bottom of their
priority list. 78 Unfortunately, even if a person proves they are a victim of
identity theft, the79Social Security Office will not even flag their account as
"compromised., The Social Security Office will only act if fraud is

dealers to "dumpster dive" to collect this information. Id. According to Buford, Ashley Furniture's
negligence made identity theft so easy and efficient that thieves had a filing system on victims
organized according to credit score. Id.
74. Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Choice PointDataCache Becamea PowderKeg: Identity Thiefs
Ability to Get Information Puts Heat on Firm, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2005, at AOl (noting that at
least 145,000 people had their identities sold to a con man in the Los Angeles area by one of
America's largest information brokers). According to Michael Sivy ChoicePoint lost data on
145,000 customers, LexisNexis lost data on 310,000 Americans, Time Warner lost close to 600,000
citizens' personal information and Bank of America released nearly 1.2 million individuals' files
to hackers. Michael Sivy et al., What No One is Telling You about Identity Theft, MONEY, July
2005, at 94.
75. Jeff Kurtz, Office of the Inspector General for the Social Security Administration,
Address at the University of Mississippi Advanced Cyber Crime Training Conference: Advanced
Training on Identity Theft Symposium, Protectionsfor Social Security Numbers (Nov. 2, 2005)
[hereinafter Kurtz Address].
76. Id. Kurtz explained that the elderly and children in particular are prime targets because
thieves can exploit their identities for an extended period of time before the victim realizes what
is happening. Moreover, these victims often do not have the political or financial means available
to them to adequately repair the situation. Id.
77. Id. This shocking statement fails to provide much hope that the government is taking
adequate steps to curb the growing exploitation of identity theft. ContraHolly K. Towle, Identity
Theft: Myths, Methods, and New Law, 30 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 237, 264-68 (2004)
(noting that the U.S. Congress has taken steps by expanding the definition of identity theft, granting
jurisdiction to prosecute the crimes in federal court and increasing the penalties, however, there is
still far to go before Americans will be safe from the crime of the "new millennium.") (citing the
Identity Theft & Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, the Internet False Identification Prevention
Act of 2000, the Federal SAFE ID Act and the Federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act
of 2003 which are all codified under 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2000 & Supp. 2003)).
78. Kurtz Address, supra note 75.
79. Id.
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perpetrated for benefits correlating with a SSN.8° The apparent ease at
which identity theft can occur is not nearly as shocking as the resulting
damage.
B. Effects of Identity Theft on Americans
The effects of identity theft are both far-reaching and devastating. Last
year a "reported" 10 million Americans were victims of identity theft with
approximately 160,000 of those being classified as "severe victims."8
Thieves can obtain new credit cards in the victim's name, divert mail to a
different address, run up charges and ultimately leave the victim with the
bill. They can open bank accounts in the victim's name, write bad checks
or counterfeit checks or authorize electronic transfers in the victim's
name.2 Thieves can file false tax returns to obtain advances or file for
bankruptcy under the victim's name, thereby destroying the victim's
credit.83 They can purchase large items like homes, cars or businesses in
the victim's names leaving the victim to deal with the balance.84 Thieves
have also been known to sell the victim's identities to illegal immigrants
thereby increasing the number of people using the victim's identity.85 To
prolong the scheme thieves may, for a short time, file tax returns and pay
bills until the balances
get too high or they wish to move onto a new
6
victim's identity.
80. Id. When Kurtz was asked what could be done, he conceded that his office lacks any
power to tell a business to stop using Social Security numbers. Kurtz advised citizens to only give
out their Social Security number when absolutely necessary and to question any business's need
for it. If the business fails to provide a satisfactory response, citizens should either not shop there
or refuse to provide the SSN. Id.
81. Bartiromo, supranote 57, at Al; contra Davis, supra note 69 (noting only 9.3 million
victims). According to Bartiromo, a "severe victim" is one where criminal(s) actually assume the
victim's identity, buys homes, gets a job, and lives as "the victim." The remaining 9.8 million are
considered only routine victims, which translates to "minor cases" such as damaged credit or
outstanding debt. Id. The problem is likely much worse because those statistics reflect only the
number of "reported victims" who actually contacted a law enforcement agency. It is highly likely
that more victims exist who simply have not learned of the crime or lack the education to ascertain
this information or know how to report it. Sivy et al., supra note 74 (noting that only 2.6% of
Americans fall victim to a burglary while 4.25% fall prey to identity theft). Other victims may be
too ashamed or reluctant to report the crime.
82. FTC, FIGHTING BACK, supra note 68, at 3.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Richard Hamp, Assistant Attorney General of Utah, Address at the University of
Mississippi Advanced Cyber Crime Training Conference: Advanced Training on Identity Theft
Symposium, InvestigatingandProsecutingStateID Theft Cases (Nov. 2,2005) [hereinafter Hamp
Address].
86. Id.
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As a result of this theft, victims are often left with enormous bills, past
due notices, and overdrawn accounts. Victims often do not know they are
victims for years. Many victims do not suspect anything until they are
finally denied credit. Upon their denial, victims often discover they have
a long history of bad credit, except for one important fact; it is not theirs.
One victim had his American Express Card declined when trying to rent
a tuxedo for his sister's wedding and soon discovered that he had nearly
$500,000 of bogus debt attached to his name.87 The victim, Mr. Fairchild,
began dedicating forty hours a week and thousands of dollars to clear up
his credit. Upon discovering his damaged credit, Fairchild's legitimate
credit accounts, which had never been delinquent, began raising his
interest rates and withdrawing credit.8"
More shocking to Fairchild was the types of services and debts now
permanently attached to his "good name."89 Fairchild was now the not-soproud owner, proprietor and defaulted debt holder of Ebony Passions, an
ethnic-metro based escort service based in a city he had never visited.
Fairchild explained that he was most upset by the fact that he and his
family had "gone without" for so many years because they could not
afford expensive things, yet the culprit treated himself to $750 shoes,
exotic cars and other lavish expenses.9"
Nearly two years later, after hundreds of phone calls to creditors,
Fairchild still gets an occasional call from a collection agency looking for
money and the process starts over again.91 If these nightmares were not
sufficient to create fear and apprehension, thieves also use their victim's
identity while committing crimes, thereby providing the victim an
undeserved criminal history.92
87. Zeller, supra note 57, at B1.
88. Id. Further exacerbating this situation is the emotional battle victims must endure when
trying to fix their credit. Timothy O'Brien writes:
Some victims, after enduring the slow torture of mending their credit histories, say
they know exactly whom to blame. "My anger at my perpetrator quickly
transferred to the credit-granting community itself... They don't care what this
does to victims because they don't have to care... [it is the] companies that are
too loose with consumer and employee information."
Timothy L. O'Brien, Gone in 60 Seconds, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 24, 2004, at 1.
89. O'Brien, supra note 88, at 1.
90. Zeller, supra note 57, at B1.
91. Id.
92. See generallyUnited States v. Morgan, 54 Fed. Appx. 421, 422 (6th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Karro, 257 F.3d 112, 114 (2d Cir. 2001); Beard v. City ofNorthglenn, 24 F.3d 110 (10th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Montejo, 353 F. Supp. 2d 643 (E.D. Va.2005); United States v. Morris,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 418 (Conn. 2005); United States v. Morehouse, 345 F. Supp. 2d 3 (Me.
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C. Ramifications Extend Beyond Simple Damaged Credit
Imagine for a moment being pulled over for a minor infraction but
rather than receiving a small fine, you are arrested, booked, and sent to jail
on several outstanding warrants. While protesting the false arrest the
police officer explains they are only "following procedure" and it is the
prosecutor's job to determine guilt. The police officer's reluctance to
release is not surprising
considering that nearly all criminals protest their
"wrongful arrest., 93 However, what happens when the arrested person is
actually innocent?94
Jack Greene explained that the clash between identity theft and law
enforcement leaves many questions unanswered because enforcement
agencies often do not share information and police officers have no way
to verify a person's identity. 95 One identity theft victim spent fifty-four
days in jail even though he repeatedly showed officials a photo of the
actual fugitive who stole his identity.96 More than one victim has been
arrested numerous times regardless of the fact that he carries, and has
constantly presented, an affidavit from the court proclaiming his
innocence.97 Considering the damage possible, the casual observer would
be shocked to learn that there are minimal penalties dealt to criminals who
wreak havoc with people's lives.98
2004); Johnson v. Scotts Bluff County Sheriff's Dep't, 245 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (Neb. 2003); Neville
v. Classic Gardens, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1377 (S.D. Ga. 2001). False criminal histories resulting from
identity theft will be addressed later in the Article. See infra Part IV.C.
93. See Davis, supranote 69, at *2. Police officers often call these arrestees "toddi or soddi"
for "the/some other dude did it." Id.Davis notes that this "phrase captures the 'culture of mistrust
around efforts to clear a criminal record.'..." Id.
94. One identity theft victim realized that the "onus is on you to persuade authorities that
you're not the alleged offender and then to fix your record... [regardless] your name may remain
as a known alias ...because the oft-arrested imposter [will] continue to give [the victim's] name
to law enforcement." Id.
95. Robert Perez, ID Theft Puts Victims in Jams with Law, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 15,
2005, at AI (quoting Jack Greene, Dean of the College of Criminal Justice at Northeastern Univ.
of Boston).
96. Id. Other victims have been pulled over for speeding and ended up being jailed, strip
searched, and detained for days simply because law enforcement agencies would not listen to
claims of innocence and identity theft. Id.
97. Bartiromo, supra note 57, at Al.
98. Mari J. Frank notes that identity theft is a "crime [for] which you can get a lot of money,
and have a very low probability of ever getting caught" and minimal penalties if convicted. Zeller,
supranote 57, at B 1.According to Frank, criminals now realize that it is safer to switch to identity
theft from traditional crimes. See id.
After one victim spent five years fixing numerous warrants,
lost her job and her home because of identity theft the perpetrator was sentenced to a two month
"work furlough" program. Michael Higgins, Identity Theft is Huge and Growing, A.B.A. J., Oct.
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Victims of identity theft have little recourse against those who
perpetrate the crime. While the law provides civil redress, criminals rarely
have sufficient funds to cover the amount of damages that might be
awarded through a judgment. Moreover, it is highly likely that the thieves
are either in prison or have "disappeared" so that victims are precluded
from even filing suit.99 Purists would retort that falsely arrested or detained
victims could seek redress through a section 1983 suit against the "wrong
doers.""1° This option too lacks appeal because the success rate, even for
egregious violations, is dismal."1'
To make matters even more complicated, identity thieves have
contrived several activities to keep police off balance. Identity thieves
have learned that if they call the police and claim that the actual victim is
stealing their identity, the police will begin investigating the "innocent

1998. More shocking to the victim was that the perpetrator showed up to her "work furlough"
program still driving the red mustang she bought with the victim's credit. Id.
99. Beth Givens noted that police have little incentive to go after identity thieves because the
crimes are often extremely complex, typical extend beyond their jurisdiction and "by the time the
victim catches on [or the police are notified] the perp is often long gone. Rubin Sabrina, She Stole
MyIdentity!, COSMO., Aug. 1, 1999, at *2.
100. Section 1983 suits are civil suits against government bodies, or their agents, for damages
resulting from deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979). Success rates for section 1983 claims are dismal and courts have been
extremely reluctant to grant relief at the cost of tying the hands of law enforcement agencies. See
generally JAMES J. TOMKOvicz & WELSH S. WHITE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF (4th ed. 2001) (scholars have seriously questioned
the effectiveness of 1983 suits as well as tort remedies for civil rights violations).
101. One victim was repeatedly arrested and put in jail even though the office of the
prosecutor had information that she was innocent of the crimes. This "knowledge" was found not
sufficient to award damages even though the victim spent needless months in jail awaiting release.
Neville v. Classic Gardens, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1378-79 (S.D. Ga. 2001) (victim filed suit
against prosecutor because they continuously delayed her release for four to five months at a time
even though they had information that she was a identity theft victim). Ultimately, the district court
noted that prosecutors exercise formidable and easily abusable power, however, absolute immunity
is more important for prosecutors to do their job. Id. at 1387. Therefore, the victim's section 1983
suit was dismissed. Id. at 1385. The Tenth Circuit also denied a victims redress through section
1983 because the victim failed to prove the prosecutors "knowingly" arrested and detained him. See
Beard v. City ofNorthglenn, 24 F.3d 110, 117-18 (10th Cir. 1994). Requiring such a finding nearly
precludes the possibility of providing redress unless a prosecutor is absurd enough to admit they
knowingly kept an innocent victim in jail. A Nebraska court, when faced with a similar section
1983 suit, found that the "Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested."
Johnson v. Scotts BluffCounty Sheriff's Dep't, 245 F. Supp. 2d. 1056, 1059-60 (Neb. 2003) (citing
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979)) (emphasis added). The Nebraska court reasoned that it
would be an undue burden on police to require them to determine whether the arrestee was actually
guilty of the crime during the arrest and detention. Id. The Nebraska court concluded that identity
theft victims will likely be unable to use section 1983 for false arrests. Id.
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02 This provides the criminal a
person" rather than the actualperpetrator.
chance to move away or escape before they themselves are arrested.'13
Criminals have also legally changed their names to the "victim's name"
shortly before trial to confuse the judge and jury." 4 While these activities
are occurring, it is not uncommon for the thief to sell or give the false
identification to someone else, thereby forcing police to expand their
search yet again.' 05
Even if a person learns they have a false criminal record there is little
remedy available. 6 This writer has been unable to find one jurisdiction
that would fully-expunge prior convictions attached to an identity number
or name.'07 Police departments and legal jurisdictions maintain that a crime
has occurred and it is attached to an identification number, namely a Social
Security Number. Prosecutors retort that a person with name X and Social
Security Number Y was convicted of the crime. They, as prosecutors, can
not now erase a conviction attached to a SSN because another person with
that name or SSN claims they did not commit the crime.
Victims undergoing these problems often suffer adverse reactions
because of these faux histories even though enforcement agencies
recognize and admit they were victims of identity theft. Victims have been
fired from theirjobs for "lying about their past" or not hired because of the
appearance of havinga felony conviction.'0 8 Some states provide affidavits
102. Todd Lawson, Assistant Attorney General of Arizona, Address at the University of
Mississippi Advanced Cyber Crime Training Conference: Advanced Training on Identity Theft
Symposium, Investigating and ProsecutingState ID Theft Cases (Nov. 2, 2005) [hereinafter
Lawson Address].
103. Sabrina, supra note 99, at *1.
104. Lawson Address, supra note 102. The effect of this treachery is yet another crime placed
on the innocent victim's record because the guilty party used the victim's name as theirs for the
trial. Id.
105. Id.; Bob Sullivan, The Secret List ofID Theft Victims, MSNBC, Jan. 25, 2005 (noting that
identify theft is increasingly used by illegal immigrants).
106. Christopher P. Couch, Forcing the Choice Between Commerce and Consumers:
Application of the FCRA to Identity Theft, 53 ALA. L. REv. 583 (2002); Pastrikos, supra note 57,
at 1137-38.
107. Sabrina, supra note 99, at *2; contra Teresa Anderson, AM. Soc'Y FOR INDUS. SEC.
MGMT., Jan. 1, 2005, at 95 (noting that some Colorado courts have "flagged" victims criminal
records noting that they "may" reflect fraud); Davis, supra note 69, at *3 (noting that a new
California law allows identity theft victims to put their name on a "watch list" that police and
prosecutors can "pull up" to verify if the name or SSN has been associated with a previous identity
theft).
108. Couch, supra note 106, at 586. Rubin Sabrina wrote:
Almost a year and a half [after being falsely arrested] [the victim] is still trying to
fix the mess. Her driver's license has been suspended due to her "warrants." Her
"criminal" past has kept her from getting jobs. Worst of all, police don't seem
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to victims explaining the "mis-leading criminal history" but that is of little
consolation considering that prejudices often rear their head in pretext
dismissals regardless of the affidavit. It appears that businesses would
rather play it safe than hire someone who "might" have a felony
conviction. "'
Destroyed credit, false arrests and humiliation aside, the effects of
these false criminal histories can have ramifications beyond those already
discussed. " 0 Now that the innocent victim has a "criminal record" they can
be flagged as "threats," across the United States.'' This factor is of grave
concern with the upcoming implementation of Secure Flight." 2 It is now
likely that identity theft victims may be precluded from flying because of
false criminal histories." 3

interested in helping her correct the situation. Her life has become so impossible
that she's considering changing her name. "When this woman gets out of jail,
there's nothing to keep her from using my name again."
Sabrina, supranote 99, at *1.
109. Businesses and prosecutors alike also question the effectiveness of these affidavits
because there is no way to validate the affidavit or ensure that it is not actually a criminal
presenting a false document. The uncertainty about an affidavit's validity is the reason why many
police officers will not release a person who presents one. The real victims are stuck between the
proverbial rock and the hard place because even documents proclaiming their innocence can be
forged by criminals and used for illicit purposes. Davis, supra note 69.
110. Julia Malone, Air FlightDatabaseProjectHits Snag; GAO Sides with Critics of TSA 's
Prescreening,ATLANTA J., Apr. 29, 2005, at 5C.
111. Even worse is the disheartening fact that identity thieves frequently sell "stolen identities"
to crime syndicates around the globe. Sivy et al., supranote 74. These syndicates then sell the ID's
to local criminals who use them when committing various crimes. Id. Thus, American citizens may
have criminal histories spanning the globe with no way of knowing until it is too late. Id. A more
severe problem arises when one of those Americans travels abroad and is arrested because of their
"criminal record." An American citizen might spend months or years in a foreign prison before they
can reach the American consulate to clear up the confusion. It is difficult to imagine a worse
scenario then being arrested in Thailand, Nigeria, or Shri-lanka on vacation; being denied any
inalienable rights or privileges of due process; pleading your innocence to a potentially uncaring
or corrupt judicial system; becoming a "guest" to the country's prison for the rest of your life; and
never understanding how you even got into the situation.
112. Fenton Johnson, Instead ofSecurity, Chaos &Blanket Excuses, SUN SENTINEL, Aug. 11,
2005, at 19A.
113. Pam Fessler, Use of Terrorists Watch Lists at American Airports, NPR, Apr. 26, 2005
(noting that identity theft is a definite problem with the system but lawmakers have chosen to go
ahead because they consider "national safety concerns" more important than the fear of false
positives). See infra Part V.B.
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V. FALSE POSITIVES FROM IDENTITY THEFT EXACERBATE SECURE
FLIGHT'S EFFECTIVENESS

A. What is Next for the American Flyer
When passengers arrive at airport gates and present their tickets and
identification, Secure Flight springs into action by searching vast private
databases and government maintained watch lists of suspected terrorists. 4
Sources predict that potential error rates for this process could be as high
as thirty percent while others claim the system will have an error rate of
no lower than two percent."' Even TSA has acknowledged that there is a
significant potential for high numbers of falsely red-coded passengers and
they "ha[ve] no indication of the accuracy of [the] information contained
in [the] government databases."' 16 This means statistically that between
400 to 1200 innocent people per year, who have committed no crime, will
be coded red, handcuffed and led away by security for being a suspected
terrorist when they reach the airport check-in counter. 7 Not even the
program's advocates can reach a consensus about whether the figure of
falsely labeled "terrorists" will decrease or increaseover time."8
Current legislative policy in the United States has done little to curb the
growing problem of identity theft." 9 This means that Secure Flight's
114. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES,
AVIATION SECURITY: COMPUTER-ASSISTED PASSENGER PRESCREENING SYSTEM FACES
SIGNIFICANT IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES, GAO-04-385, at 6 (Feb. 2004), available at

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04385.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2005) [hereinafter GAO Report].
115. See, e.g., Lane County Bill of Rights Defense Committee, CAPPS II, available at
http://www.lanerights.org/capps.htm (last visited Nov. 3,2005); contra Goo, supranote 64, at AO
(stating that Secure Flight will likely incorrectly identify two percent of passengers as flight risks);
Audrey Hudson, Airline ProfilingSystem Defended, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at A11.
116. GAO Report, supra note 114, at 15.
117. Kite, supranote 3, at 1421; Goo, supra note 64, at AO1. These figures are based on a one
million person per day average.
118. Kite, supranote 3, at 1421; Ann Davis, BoardingImpasse: Why a 'NoFly List'Aimed
at Terrorists Often Delays Others, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 22, 2003, at Al.
119. Pastrikos, supra note 57, at 1442 (stating that identity theft results in harms to "the
individual's reputation or credit rating, inconvenience, and other difficulties resulting from the
offense" (citing Sean B. Hoar, Identity Theft: The Crime of the New Millennium, 80 OR. L. REV.
1423, 1432 (2001); Liz Pulliam Weston, Blame Lenders, Not Thieves for Identity Theft, CNBC
MONEY

MATTERS,

at

http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/Banking/

Financial

Privacy/P48173.asp?GT1=6239 (stating that because of two fraudulent entries in the LexisNexis
and Choicepoint consumer databases, nearly 145,000 people had their identities stolen from that
database) (last visited Nov. 17, 2005)). Constant refusal by lenders to work within policy
complicates the issue and victims are left without anywhere to turn to fix their problem. Id. Lenders
refuse to abide by search warrants or requests for information from out of state courts and refuse
to speak with police investigating complaints because they make more money by using lax
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defects will be compounded by this country's increasing identity crisis. 2 °
Identity thefts combined with the already excessive error rates projected
by experts, strongly suggests significant issues for the public at large. 2'
People living in this country have learned to deal with the ever
increasing security which pervades our daily existence. We cope on a day
to day basis with the implicit accusations from automated security systems
and lurking cameras. 22
' In addition to the degradation from cashiers failing
to properly deactivate sensor strips at your local retailer,'23 citizens and
visitors can now look forward to possibly being falsely labeled a
"terrorist" at their local airport by an unseen accuser.124 Passengers may
application procedures. Id. Consumer databases, and the lenders who use them, have hardly any
oversight and use it to their advantage. Id. Recently a subsidiary of LexisNexis had its customer
database hacked and over 310,000 people had their social security numbers, drivers licenses, and
addresses stolen and the company did not even know it until they happened upon it accidentally.
Associated Press, LexisNexis ID Theft Much Worse Than Thought, MSNBC NEWS, at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7475594/ (stating that Reed Elsevier's database located in Boca
Raton, Florida provides data for Matrix) (last visited Nov. 11, 2005). Reed Elsevier's Matrix
contract is one of the U.S. anti-terrorism database contracts that is currently used by TSA and will
be utilized by Secure Flight. See id.Perhaps the theft of over 300,000 identities in a database used
by Secure Flight will prompt congressional review because of the great potential for error and abuse
in dataveillance.
120. After people have realized that someone else has been using their identity, they have been
unable to fix it because States refuse to delete records created by the identity thief. Many of these
victims must carry documents for the rest of their lives explaining they are not felons, child
molesters, or insolvent. With the current Secure Flight system, this "carry-around documentation"
would not alleviate the problem because the government will posit that these documents could
easily be forged or presented by actual terrorists. Moreover, while these identity theft victims try
to explain their dilemma to the arresting officer, their flight will be leaving with their families or
friends on board or even worse causing the entire family to miss their vacation, wedding, or other
"once in a lifetime" event. Davis, supra note 69, at *3.
121. Kite, supranote 3, at 1421; Goo, supranote 64, at A01; Davis, supra note 118; Hudson,
supra note 115.
122. See generally Jamie James, Why IDon 't Live in America, AM. SCHOLAR, Autumn 2004,
at 109 (author explaining her reasons, one of which was a pervasive feeling of too little trust, for
leaving America to live in Indonesia). Pastrikos notes that, "[c]omplications from identitytheft may
also require embarrassing explanations if employers or law enforcement officials perform a
background check on a victim." Pastrikos, supranote 57, at 1154.
123. See, e.g., Deseriee A. Kennedy, Processing Civil Rights Summary Judgment and
Consumer DiscriminationClaims, 53 DEPAuL L. REV. 989 (2004); see generally James P. Nehf,
Incomparabilityandthe Passive Virtues ofAd Hoc PrivacyPolicy, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2005);
see Amanda G. Main, Note, Racial Profiling in Places of Public Accommodation: Theories of
Recovery and Relief, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 289, 296 (2001).
124. Once this fear becomes a reality our society moves one step closer to Orwell's
government controlled dominance of its citizens. "[Computer] data processing creates a potential
for suppressing a capacity for free choice. The more that is known about an individual, the easier
it is to force his obedience ... the state and private organizations can [then] transform themselves
into omnipotent parents." Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and
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now worry that they might be led away in handcuffs because a computer
has misdiagnosed a personal preference, commercial purchase, or entity
authentication.
Due to the level of inconvenience and embarrassment that the system
might cause, most people would expect an effective oversight system to
exist which could mitigate the possible damage that Secure Flight could
cause. Considering the risk, it seems quite reasonable that the government
would place a high value on "fixing" whatever led the computer to falsely
red-code the passenger in the first place. Much to this author's dismay,
almost no procedures exist whereby an aggrieved passenger can get help,
or for that matter even find out exactly why they were flagged as a
potential terrorist in the first place. 125 This security veneer exists,
according to the TSA and the Department of Homeland Security, to
from ever knowing why they were coded
prevent aggrieved passengers
"red" for security reasons. 126 To make matters worse, red-coded persons
may only bring complaints based on information they obtained from their
it nearly impossible to effectively contest
own records 127 thereby making
128
assessment.
a Secure Flight
This means that passengers can only access the information that they
provided personally when they bought the tickets. This type of information
would include their name, address, telephone number, credit card number,
date of birth and any other distinguishing factors. 129 These factors are
known as the Passenger Name Record (PNR). 30 At check-in the PNR is
automatically cross checked with Secure Flight to determine how the
potential flier with be coded. None of the relevant or disputable
information which flagged the passenger will be disclosed and they will
Metaphorsfor InformationPrivacy, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1393, 1396 (2001) (alteration in original)
(citing PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 39 (1996)).
125. It is important to note that once a passenger has been red-coded and denied boarding the
damage has been done because they have been denied their liberty interest without due process of
law. Dummer, supranote 52. TSA fails to address this issue when outlining its redress procedures.
Id. If a person's liberty or property interest is infringed without due process that, by itself, is a
violation of a fundamental right provided by the U.S. Constitution. Id. Further discussion of this
topic should be undertaken by academics and Congress before Secure Flight, or future permutations
of the system, are implemented.
126. Kite, supra note 3, at 1424.
127. Id.at 1425.
128. According to a GAO Report, "TSA officials stated that passengers will not have access
to any government data used to generate a passenger risk score due to the national security
concerns." GAO Report, supra note 114, at 26.
129. Id. at 26; Kite, supra note 3, at 1425.
130. Steven Roberts, Big Brotheris Watching, 26 NAT'L L.J. 62, 63 (2004).
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receive no explanation about why they were denied passage.1 3 1 In spite of
the paradigm the United States Congress exists within, it is this writer's
belief that the modem law still requires that evidence be presented against
the accused before they can be punished.'32 Secure Flight and TSA
apparently have chosen to disregard these requirements as aggrieved
passengers are told nothing about why they were flagged "red."
Little could be more discouraging than being detained and escorted
away by security, leaving friends and loved ones standing at the terminal
gate while being told by security that the only information they can
provide to you is your own name, birth date and telephone number.'33 To
further exacerbate the situation, the passenger information which "redlimited period of time before it is
coded" you will be kept for
134 only a
deleted from Secure Flight.
B. Affecting Victims Beyond Intent
Considering the precarious nature ofdataveillance and the uncertainties
discussed above, the implementation of Secure Flight, and future versions
based on the same concept, as a pre-screening system for air travel in
America, will likely create numerous problems for identity theft victims.
Considering the lack of empathy with which Secure Flight and TSA
designed their enforcement measures, victims of identity theft will likely
suffer great inconveniences because of their destroyed credit, false
histories and suspect purchases. Because TSA has admitted the lack of
oversight of private data collection agencies and recognized the fallibility
ofthe information kept in those databases, it is not unreasonable to assume
that identity theft poses severe concerns for persons wishing to fly. TSA
and current watch groups already question the enormous error rates
expected to falsely flag innocent flyers as threats, and the situation will
likely be made worse by the ten million instances of reported identity
thefts each year. Moreover, considering the 160,000 reported instances of
131. GAO Report, supra note 114, at 26; Kite, supra note 3, at 1426. Although it is possible
that a terrorist might declare their true intentions while purchasing their ticket, it is extremely
unlikely.
132. See Karen Cunningham, "A Spanish Heartin an English Body": The Ralegh Treason
Trialand the Poetics of Proof,22 J. MEDIEVAL& RENAISSANCE STUD. 327 (1992); Mark Nicholls,
Sir Walter Ralegh 's Treason:A ProsecutionDocument, 110 ENG. HIST. REV. 902 (1995).
133. Implicit in this scenario is the issue of false imprisonment and lack of probable cause,
however, discussion of this expansive topic is beyond the scope of this Article but should be noted
when considering the potential impact of Secure Flight on passengers and their constitutional rights.
See generally Dummer, supra note 52.
134. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, CAPPS II: Myths and Facts (Feb. 13,
2003), available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3163 (last visited Nov. 11,
2005).
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"severe identity thefts" within the United States, it is highly likely that at
least some of the 160,000 Americans will be denied the ability to fly
because of the activities of criminals.
VI. CONCLUSION

Air travel as a means of transportation has lost its luster and is now
about as pleasant as a crowded subway ride.' 35 Travelers are told to arrive
at airports hours ahead of time to allow for long security lines. Then, rather
than being welcomed by cheery smiles, flyers are subjected to potential
unconstitutional searches and investigations before being allowed to board.
Passengers are now confronted with unpleasant experiences for the sake
of security and the situation does not seem to be getting better. 3 6 The
financial losses faced by the airline industry suggest that these issues will
need to be addressed or else passengers may no longer consider flying a
viable mode of travel. These problems, compounded with the ever present
threat of having your identity stolen or misused, illustrate that America
and its citizens are at an impasse that must be addressed quickly or even
more Americans will see their rights being removed with little to no
redress available to them.
A non-partisan congressional review board must be developed to
bridge the gap between flyers and TSA officials. The board should
function as an intermediary between the system's victims and TSA while
balancing citizen grievances against national security needs. To
accomplish their task the board must have access to all secret procedures
and types of data mined so they can better determine what is necessary
when viewed against the nation's best interests. Additionally, TSA must
modify Secure Flight to address the increasing problem of identity theft.
These actions must be taken before Secure Flight is implemented or
another injustice may be visited upon the American people.

135. Delays Warning in U.S. Air Security Crackdown: Fingerprintsand Photos to be Taken
as Anti-TerroristRules Tightened, SCOT. NEWSPAPERS LTD., Sept. 29, 2004 (noting that 33,000
people coming into the United States will be affected every day and this will result in even longer
wait times and delays). See also Brian Bennett, Air Safety: Extending the No-Fly Zone, TIME, Apr.
17,2005, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1050224,00.htmi (noting that No-Fly
lists expansion to 31,000 names may begin to impede over-flight rights closely guarded within
international treaties).
136. See Lauren Bayne Anderson, It's Time to Ditch Your Bics at Airport, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2005 (recent reports show that airport safety has not improved since 9/11).
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